Tanilo
Trust

What you can check yourself, and what we still owe you.

No live counters, no endpoint you have to trust us to keep up. Everything below either verifies offline against a published key, or is named as open with no date attached to it.

Current status · checked 6 November 2026

  • Live endpoints: /v1/verify-facts (rule-based checks, free public beta) and /evaluate (model-based assessment, experimental, free public beta). Both are rate-limited and need no key.
  • Signing key: tanilo-2026-10-ed25519-7d885da9 since 2 October 2026, in the published key set. Retired keys stay published (section 01).
  • Payments: none. The paid research routes were retired on 4 October 2026, and the API’s payment manifest lists no payable resources.
  • Withdrawn: the API gateway’s self-serve tier and its /v1/compose signing route (24 September 2026; 410 since 28 September), and the service host’s /v1/sign, /v1/compose and /v1/v_gate routes (no issuance since 28 August 2026).
  • Records kept: the August 2026 incident record, the key history below and the items still open in section 04.

01Keys

Keys in the published JWKS

tanilo-2026-10-ed25519-7d885da9 — current. Tanilo's signing key, in use since 2026-10-02. Its receipt-signing paths are /evaluate and /v1/verify-facts, both of which run the check themselves; it has no path that signs a verdict supplied by the caller. Those receipts name issuer tanilo.io and this page's key set. It also signs the separately identified key-continuity statement. Its JWKS entry declares role: evaluated, and every receipt it signs carries role: evaluated in the protected header.

ao-composed-2026-06-ed25519-c3abfce3 — retired 2026-10-02, when Tanilo's key went live. It signed /evaluate and /v1/verify-facts receipts on agentoracle.co, both of which run the check themselves; neither signs a verdict supplied by the caller. It stays published so existing signatures under it can still be checked; rotation alone does not invalidate them, and receipt validity, freshness and relying-party acceptance remain separate checks. From 23 June to 28 August 2026 it also signed bytes supplied by the caller through /v1/sign and /v1/sign/batch, and stub verdicts through that host's /v1/compose and /v1/v_gate. Since 28 August the sign routes refuse to sign and the stub routes don't issue. A forged payload could carry any timestamp, so no signature under this key shows on its own that the service issued the payload. It carries no role: it signed both kinds of bytes, so neither role value is true of every signature under it, and under the issuance-path role rule, signatures under it resolve to role unknown. That is separate from signature validity, and a relying party that requires an established issuance path treats unknown as its own fail.

ao-composed-2026-07-ed25519-3d44ba27 — retired; withdrawn 24 September 2026, when its private key was deleted. Its only signing path was the API gateway's /v1/compose (27 July to 24 September), which signed verdicts the caller supplied and whose handler returns 410 since 28 September 2026 (unauthenticated requests are refused with 401 before reaching it). Its signatures prove the bytes are unchanged, not that anything was evaluated. Its JWKS entry declares role: bytes_attested.

ao-receipt-2026-04-ed25519-f2753b7c — legacy. Published 29 April 2026 for the v0.1 receipt format. It signed the attached sample receipt in the spec repo. We found no signing path for it in the current service code. We haven't established where its private key is held or whether it still exists, so we say so here instead of guessing. No role: its full signing history is not established.

ao-fixture-detached-rfc7797-2026-07-ed25519-0f8bf2a5 — test fixture only. Its private key is published in the spec repo (examples/jwks-fixture-detached.json) so the fixture can be reproduced. Anyone can sign with it, so a signature from it proves nothing about issuance. No role. 2026-10-16: At 2026-10-16 19:05:02 UTC, we confirmed that the fixture key was absent from the production key sets served at tanilo.io, api.tanilo.io and agentoracle.co. Previously downloaded copies may still contain it. The key is served separately at the test-key endpoints (tanilo.io/.well-known/jwks-test.json, also at api.tanilo.io) and remains in the spec repository's fixture file. It was in the agentoracle.co key set from 29 July 2026 and in the tanilo.io and api.tanilo.io sets from 2 October 2026. A signature under a publicly available private key does not establish that Tanilo issued the receipt, because anyone can create such a signature. A verifier that did not read its fixture status accepted a signature under it as valid against the production set; every release of tanilo-receipt-verify before 0.2.4 (and agentoracle-receipt-verify 0.1.0) did. The production signer code reviewed does not select this fixture key, and the fixture's private key has never appeared in the API repository's history. That finding does not establish that no receipt signed with the public fixture key was accepted by a relying party. What to do: upgrade to tanilo-receipt-verify 0.2.4, fetch the key set again, and treat any receipt that verified only through this kid as not verified. A key identifier alone does not establish that a receipt is genuine. Reverify the receipt using an authenticated production key set and the applicable verification policy. Historical receipts may use other documented production keys. If you retained only an overall verification status, reverify the original receipts rather than assuming they used a production key. Investigate any decisions that relied on receipts accepted solely through the fixture key. Removing the key does not retroactively change previously stored verification results.

Algorithm
Ed25519 (RFC 8032), canonicalized per RFC 8785 (JCS) before signing
Published keys
tanilo.io/.well-known/jwks.json — the same key set is served at api.tanilo.io/.well-known/jwks.json. Each key carries a tanilo_status member (current, retired or legacy), tanilo_retired_at where it applies, and, where the key's history supports it, a role member (evaluated or bytes_attested) declaring what signatures under that key attest.
Test key set
tanilo.io/.well-known/jwks-test.json — the fixture key only, with tanilo_status fixture. The production signer code reviewed does not select this fixture key. Use it only to check the spec repo's detached sample, and never merge it into a trust list.
Key continuity
tanilo.io/.well-known/key-continuity.json — a statement listing every key above with its status, signed on 2026-10-02 by both the retiring key ao-composed-2026-06-ed25519-c3abfce3 and tanilo-2026-10-ed25519-7d885da9. It ties the older kids to this publisher, so the signature on a receipt issued under a retired key can still be checked with key material from tanilo.io. It does not establish that any older payload was evaluated.
Rotation policy
New signing key at least every 12 months, or immediately if a private key may have been exposed. Retired keys stay published in the JWKS so existing signatures under them can still be checked; rotation alone does not invalidate them, and receipt validity, freshness and relying-party acceptance remain separate checks.

Tanilo signs with tanilo-2026-10-ed25519-7d885da9 since 2026-10-02, a new key with no signing history before Tanilo; ao-composed-2026-06-ed25519-c3abfce3 is not used for new issuance. Retired and legacy keys stay published so existing signatures under them can still be checked; rotation alone does not invalidate them, and receipt validity, freshness and relying-party acceptance remain separate checks. Receipts issued before 2026-10-02 are not re-signed: they are exactly as issued. Full account of both signing paths: /incidents/2026-08-25-canned-verdicts ↗.

Mapping documents, cutover on 13 October 2026 (UTC). A receipt's v_gate.mapping_hash names the rule document that governed its v_recommendation. Receipts signed before the cutover bind to agentoracle-v0.3-2026-05-30 (sha256 0a78263976790df6e76cd9f3f441bf5a3b5c3a82e346b5aca43e49626881d7b0) and are byte for byte unchanged; receipts signed after it bind to tanilo-v0.3-2026-10-13 (sha256 52842536d5c8444b6add8e8cb7e8987aa3fcc0bf40cc7ac266ddc1744f0711ce). Rely on mapping_id and mapping_hash rather than the signing date to tell them apart. The rules are identical; the documents differ only in identifier, issuer name, resolution URL and publication date. Both are immutable and stay published: agentoracle-v0.3-2026-05-30, tanilo-v0.3-2026-10-13, and at api.tanilo.io/mappings/<sha256>.json.

02Second implementation

A byte-identical second implementation, built by a different party from the published text. AgentTrust implemented the verification envelope from the specification; the fixtures and vectors that prove it landed in argentum-core/examples/conformance/agenttrust-v1 (PR #33, merged 2026-07-16).

03Verify a receipt yourself

Same commands as /verify. Nothing here requires calling Tanilo — only the published key.

offline verification
$ pip install tanilo-receipt-verify
$ curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TKCollective/tanilo-receipt-spec/a565999/examples/live-receipts/evaluate-demo-2026-10-02.json -o receipt.json \
&& curl -s https://tanilo.io/.well-known/jwks.json -o jwks.json
$ python3 -c "import json; from tanilo_receipt_verify import verify; r=verify(json.load(open('receipt.json')), jwks_by_issuer={'https://tanilo.io/.well-known/jwks.json': json.load(open('jwks.json'))}); print(r.status, r.canonical_sha256)"

This is the same receipt as the homepage, issued by /evaluate on 2026-10-02 and signed with tanilo-2026-10-ed25519-7d885da9, Tanilo's own key. Until 2026-09-30 this section showed a receipt signed through the gateway route withdrawn on 24 September 2026, over a verdict the caller supplied; see the incident record.

Corrected 2026-10-06. From 2026-10-02 until this correction, this section still showed the receipt issued on 2026-09-30, signed with ao-composed-2026-06-ed25519-c3abfce3, while saying it was the same receipt as the homepage. The homepage had moved to the 2026-10-02 receipt. This section now shows that receipt too.

Node and browser verifiers use the same JCS + Ed25519 semantics and produce the same canonical hash byte-for-byte. Full registry entry: /receipt-registry.

History of the homepage's receipt check

Moved here from the homepage on 2026-10-06, word for word. "This section" in the notes below means the homepage's receipt check.

This is a real receipt, issued by /evaluate on 2026-10-02 for the claim "Paris is the capital of France." — not a synthetic example. It is signed with tanilo-2026-10-ed25519-7d885da9, Tanilo's own key. Its protected JWS header carries role: evaluated. A valid signature shows the bytes are unchanged since signing and were signed by that key; it does not show that the claim is true. The verifier is MIT-licensed, no dependencies on us. Read it before you trust it — that's the point.

Added 2026-09-30. Until 2026-09-30 this section showed a receipt signed through our API gateway's /v1/compose route, which signed the verdict the caller supplied without checking the claim. That route was withdrawn on 24 September 2026 and returns 410 since 28 September 2026 (see the incident record). Receipts under Tanilo's new key will come only from routes where the service evaluates the claim.

Updated 2026-10-02: this section now uses a receipt signed with Tanilo's own key.

Updated 2026-11-10: the homepage's receipt check now uses a saved /v1/verify-facts receipt for the homepage's file example, so the receipt matches the check a visitor has just run. It records a hash_comparison of the proposed attachment (“Delivery in 60 days”) against the SHA-256 digest of the approved copy (“Delivery in 30 days”): outcome fail (digest_mismatch), gate halt, signed with tanilo-2026-10-ed25519-7d885da9 (receipt, full API response). The Paris /evaluate receipt described above is unchanged. It stays on the verification guide and at /receipts/evaluate-2026-10-02-paris.json.

04What's still open

Shipped 2026-10-02 for the current key

Issuance-path assertion

Shipped 2026-10-02 for tanilo-2026-10-ed25519-7d885da9: every receipt it signs carries role: evaluated in the protected JWS header, and its JWKS entry carries the matching role member. Still open for the older keys: ao-composed-2026-06-ed25519-c3abfce3 carries no role, so signatures under it resolve to role unknown; ao-composed-2026-07-ed25519-3d44ba27 is declared bytes_attested; and verifier-side role resolution in tanilo-receipt-verify and the draft's format text remain unshipped, with no date.

A receipt doesn't say which route produced it. Before 2026-10-02, c3abfce3 remained the receipt-signing key after its caller-supplied signing paths closed on 28 August; at cutover it stops new receipt issuance; 3d44ba27 signed only caller-supplied verdicts and was withdrawn on 24 September 2026. A receipt shows its key ID, but not what that key was used for; that mapping is stated here, not in the receipt. The fix is a role parameter in the JWS protected header, checked against a role member on the signing key in the published JWKS. The role-in-header design is Pote's (poteshniy, AgentTrust); it is not yet normative text in the filed -02 draft. Update 2026-10-09: the same is true of the filed -03 draft (1 October 2026), whose JWS envelope section names no role parameter. Update 2026-10-02: the issuer side is live. The Tanilo key's JWKS entry declares role: evaluated and every receipt it signs carries role: evaluated in the protected header; 3d44ba27 is declared bytes_attested; c3abfce3 carries no role, so under the issuance-path role rule, signatures under it resolve to role unknown. That is separate from signature validity, and a relying party that requires an established issuance path treats unknown as its own fail. The values are evaluated and bytes_attested, as agreed with Pote on 2 September 2026. Under the proposed issuance-path role rule, absence of a role gives an issuance-path resolution of unknown; it does not by itself make the receipt malformed. Existing signed bytes are unchanged, and signature validity, freshness and relying-party acceptance remain separate. Issuer-side annotation is live; verifier-side role resolution (role_resolution in tanilo-receipt-verify) and the draft format text remain unshipped, with no date, so this item stays open until both ship.

Defense in depth, not the fix

Kid separation

Giving evaluation receipts and sign-only receipts distinct key identifiers was the first fix proposed for the same-kid conflation above. It's still worth doing operationally, but the issuance-path assertion is the durable fix — it survives key rotation and doesn't require a verifier to keep a mapping table current.

In the spec, not yet in production

instrument_failure emission

The IETF draft (-02 and -03) defines instrument_failure so a non-evaluation can be signed and recorded instead of producing no receipt at all. The running service hasn't been updated to emit it yet.

05Filed specification

The receipt format is filed as an IETF Internet-Draft: draft-krausz-verification-state (current revision -03, filed 2026-10-01). It defines the on-wire semantics — act/halt verdict, canonicalization, signer binding, and the reason-code vocabulary referenced above.

It is an individual submission, not an adopted standard. An open draft revision covering sealed evidence and multi-clock anchors is in review as PR #5 on the spec repo; it is not part of the shipped receipt format.

Receipts are canonicalized with RFC 8785 (JCS) and signed with Ed25519 (RFC 8032). Two reference verifiers produce the same canonical bytes, and a second implementation by a different party is described in section 02.